European lawmakers have revived a proposal that would shift the power to approve—or deny—member states’ weapons export licenses to the European Commission, reopening a high-stakes sovereignty fight for France.
The idea surfaced in an amendment tucked into a European Parliament report published December 22, 2025. For France—described in the report as the world’s No. 2 arms exporter over the past five years—the issue goes far beyond paperwork, striking at Paris’ ability to decide on its own who can buy French-made Rafale fighter jets, missiles, and submarines.
The report’s language is explicit: “The security situation requires the coherent establishment of approval and certification procedures regulated at the level of the European Union for new production facilities and export licenses for defense products,” it says, in the context of proposed changes to EU directives governing intra-EU transfers of defense-related products. If adopted, the Commission would become the referee for contracts signed by French defense champions including Dassault, MBDA, and Naval Group with foreign customers.
A comeback after an earlier French block
This is not Brussels’ first attempt. In September 2025, the European Commission included similar provisions in its so-called “defense omnibus package,” which the Mars group said aimed to “progressively [seize] the sovereign prerogatives of states in matters of export controls.” France blocked that effort, and Paris’ opposition was enough to keep the measure out at that stage.
Now the European Parliament has taken up the file. Analysts describe the approach as the “railcar and salami” tactic—moving in small slices: a technical amendment here, a delegated act there—until the Commission effectively holds the levers to define what equipment is “sensitive,” which licenses to grant or refuse, and when exemptions apply.
French specialists are particularly concerned about the use of delegated acts, a mechanism that could allow the Commission to set rules without a systematic vote by the Council—sidestepping the veto France used in 2025. The Lecornu government, the article says, has not yet responded publicly to this renewed push while absorbed by repeated budget negotiations.
Two opposing risks for French defense companies
The potential consequences cut in two directions. On one hand, Brussels could authorize exports that Paris would have rejected for diplomatic, strategic, or operational reasons. On the other, it could block deals that are crucial to the economic balance of certain programs.
A Brussels-driven refusal to approve Rafale exports to a given customer—rather than a decision made in Paris—would disrupt Dassault Aviation’s production planning and, by extension, the workload of hundreds of subcontractors, the article argues.
Bruno Alomar, a former senior European Commission official, summed up the stakes in a January 2026 opinion piece in Le Figaro, writing that the measure would project “the image of a France lowered in a Europe that is sinking.” He pointed to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which explicitly excludes from the single market equipment deemed indispensable to a member state’s national security. According to Alomar, the Commission is seeking to narrow the scope of that article over time to bring armaments into the ordinary logic of the single market.
“Coordination” or an economic fight inside Europe?
Behind the amendment’s security-coherence argument, several analysts see a different motive. “It is clear that these provisions will fuel an economic war between European companies in the defense sector. All of this will weaken or exclude European competitors, with the more or less explicit complicity of companies from third countries or foreign states that will consolidate their interests,” observers quoted by La Tribune warned.
France, the article says, is structurally exposed on this issue. As the world’s second-largest arms exporter—far behind the United States—it is a natural target for competitors seeking to rebalance markets in their favor through common regulation. For some EU countries less exposed to these stakes, transferring export-control responsibilities to Brussels could be a welcome administrative simplification. For Paris, the article describes it as a red line.
| Indicateur | Valeur |
|---|---|
| Rang mondial (cinq dernières années) | 2e exportateur mondial d’armements |
| Principal exportateur devant la France | États-Unis |
Source : La Tribune
Article 346: the legal backstop France is leaning on
EU law does provide a theoretical shield. Article 346 allows each member state to keep out of the single market equipment it considers indispensable to its security. France has long relied on that basis to justify maintaining its own export-control system.
But the Commission has been chipping away at that perimeter, the article argues, by gradually pulling “defense products” into the single-market framework—on the grounds that some less-sensitive items are already subject to relatively open competition.
The article cites a precedent that it says is uncomfortable for Paris: the EU’s 2003 working-time directive applies to the French armed forces, “against all legal reason,” Alomar wrote. The case, he argued, shows the EU is willing to encroach on powers France considers untouchable when it has a legal lever to do so.
What Paris has to decide next
The amendment has not yet been adopted. The European Parliament still has to examine it, and France retains room to influence the final text.
But the clock is working against Paris, the article says: the government is bogged down in budget trade-offs, and each week without a firm political response leaves more space for parliamentary groups that favor transferring authority to Brussels.
For French defense manufacturers, the outcome of the standoff will directly shape their ability to close export deals without going through a Brussels filter whose timeline and criteria they do not control. In a global market where decision speed can matter as much as technical performance, the article argues, losing control of export licenses would be a lasting competitive disadvantage.
