France’s top military officer is openly warning that Germany’s rapid defense buildup could soon outstrip France’s long-held advantage in Europe—unless Paris finds a way to keep pace.
Testifying before the French Senate’s Finance Committee on May 11, Gen. Fabien Mandon, France’s chief of the defense staff, said a French “falling behind” Germany is “possible”—not as a theoretical risk, but as a trajectory already underway. “If Germany continues at this pace, in five years, the argument that we benefit from operational experience and a certain culture will no longer hold,” he told senators.
The numbers behind that warning are stark. A French Treasury outlook note published in November 2025 said Berlin plans to raise defense and security spending to €167.8 billion (about $181.2 billion) in 2029, up from €66.8 billion (about $72.1 billion) in 2024—an increase of 150% in five years. For 2026 alone, Germany’s defense ministry has a regular budget of €82.7 billion (about $89.3 billion), plus €25.5 billion (about $27.5 billion) drawn from the Bundeswehr’s special fund created in 2022, for a total of €108.2 billion (about $116.9 billion).
Berlin builds, Paris argues over how much it can afford
France’s spending path is far more constrained. A proposed update to France’s 2024–2030 military planning law would set the defense budget at €76.3 billion (about $82.4 billion) in 2030—described as 2.5% of GDP—after adding €36 billion (about $38.9 billion) beyond the 2023 version of the plan.
But the French Senate’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee says that still isn’t enough. It has proposed adding another €14 billion (about $15.1 billion) to reach €83.9 billion (about $90.6 billion) in 2030, aligning with what the article describes as France’s NATO commitment to devote 3.5% of GDP to defense.
For Mandon, the gap is structural—and increasingly visible to allies. “For the Americans, the European reference is gradually becoming Germany,” he said. Within five years, he added, “the differential will be striking.”
France vs. Germany defense spending: the trajectory in black and white
| Pays | Dépenses 2024 | Dépenses 2026 (budget voté) | Objectif 2029-2030 |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | N/C | N/C | 76,3 Mds € (LPM actualisée) / 83,9 Mds € (proposition Sénat) |
| Allemagne | 66,8 Mds € | 108,2 Mds € (budget ordinaire + Fonds spécial) | 167,8 Mds € en 2029 |
Source : The Voice of Emirates, Direction générale du Trésor (novembre 2025)
FCAS fighter project becomes a symbol of a stalled partnership
The widening gap isn’t only about budgets. It’s also industrial—and the flagship example is FCAS, the Future Combat Air System, announced in 2017 to replace France’s Rafale and the Eurofighter around 2040.
According to Le Monde, France, Germany and Spain still have not reached agreement on the architecture of the next-generation fighter aircraft, the program’s centerpiece. The aircraft is tied to six additional components: the engine, a “tactical cloud,” sensors, combat drones, stealth technology and overall system coherence.
The deadlock comes after two years of engineering work, long intergovernmental negotiations and several billion euros already committed. France nevertheless included €1.2 billion (about $1.3 billion) in new payment credits for FCAS in its 2026 budget. On the French industrial side, the companies involved are Safran and Thales, alongside Indra (Spain) and MTU (Germany).
In late 2025, Reuters reported that Berlin and Paris were discussing scaling back the program—estimated at €100 billion (about $108 billion)—including by dropping plans to jointly build the fighter jet. The article describes that option as effectively hollowing out FCAS and calling into question a decade of Franco-German industrial cooperation in military aviation.
The stakes go beyond one aircraft. If FCAS is reduced or abandoned, Dassault Aviation would be left to build a Rafale successor on its own, with the budget constraints that implies. Thales and Safran would lose what the article calls a structuring order for their technology road maps in onboard systems and military propulsion.
Pistorius’ doctrine: make the Bundeswehr Europe’s strongest conventional force
On the German side, the direction is explicit. Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister since the Scholz government and, according to Le Monde, the country’s most popular politician for the past three years, published a military strategic review in April with the stated ambition of making the Bundeswehr “the most powerful conventional army in Europe.”
The article notes that Pistorius has repeated that phrase for months—and that it is now official doctrine, not rhetorical aspiration. Germany’s military still struggles to absorb the flood of funding; despite unprecedented financial resources, structural reforms are moving slowly. But, as the article puts it, bureaucratic inertia doesn’t change the arithmetic.
With €108.2 billion (about $116.9 billion) in 2026 and a path toward €167.8 billion (about $181.2 billion) in 2029, Germany will build—by sheer volume—a force France cannot match with its current resources.
Mandon’s warning to senators focused on the mismatch between France’s accumulated operational capital—combat experience, expeditionary culture and force integration—and the raw expansion of a heavily financed Bundeswehr. That advantage, he argued, erodes if the budget gap persists. “No qualitative advantage can indefinitely withstand a quantitative balance of power of 1 to 3,” the article says.
One detail stood out to Mandon: Pistorius’ strategic review does not mention France even once—silence that, in his view, signals Germany’s positioning.
Nuclear deterrence remains France’s unique card—though it has limits
France still holds one capability Germany cannot replicate quickly: nuclear weapons. In March, President Emmanuel Macron announced an increase in the number of French nuclear warheads, adding that France would no longer disclose any details about the size of its stockpile. He said the effort is “complementary to NATO’s nuclear mission” and constitutes a distinct “advanced deterrence.”
Mandon emphasized that point to the Senate committee: “Nuclear deterrence is part of Europe’s defense equation.” He also framed it in stark terms: “Our continent is experiencing war and we know that Russia is capable of venturing beyond Ukraine. The American presence, moreover, is diminishing.” In that context, the article notes, France remains the only sovereign nuclear power in the European Union—something Germany’s budget surge does not change.
But Mandon also acknowledged the limits. Nuclear deterrence does not make up for a lack of conventional mass; it protects national survival, but it does not provide day-to-day operational influence in sub-nuclear crises, which the article describes as the norm.
Macron has called for collective reflection on European deterrence since a speech at Île Longue, asking partners to “think together” about the equation. Mandon echoed that appeal: “When the Germans plan to manufacture certain types of powerful missiles, that also concerns France. We need to communicate more.”
The article argues the industrial challenge is intertwined with the strategic one: if FCAS derails, budgets diverge and coordination remains weak, French deterrence risks becoming an isolated pillar rather than a lever of influence inside a coherent European defense. The final 2030 budget France’s armed forces receive—€76.3 billion (about $82.4 billion) or €83.9 billion (about $90.6 billion), depending on arbitration between the government and the Senate—will define how much weight Paris can still carry as Germany’s Bundeswehr accelerates.
