France’s top military officer is warning lawmakers that the country could lose its standing as a leading European military power as Germany rapidly expands its defense budget.
Testifying May 11 before the French Senate’s Finance Committee, Gen. Fabien Mandon, the chief of the defense staff, did not rule out what he called a “decoupling” scenario. “Decoupling is possible,” he told Sen. Dominique de Legge, the Senate’s special rapporteur for the defense budget, when asked about the widening gap between French and German spending.
Berlin at €108.2 billion in 2026, while France charts a lower path
The numbers Mandon cited highlight the scale of the divergence. In 2026, Germany is allocating €108.2 billion (about $116.9 billion) to its armed forces: €82.7 billion (about $89.3 billion) from the Defense Ministry’s regular budget, plus €25.5 billion (about $27.5 billion) drawn from the Bundeswehr’s special fund created in 2022.
According to a note from France’s Treasury Directorate General published in November, Berlin plans to raise its combined defense and security spending to €167.8 billion (about $181.2 billion) in 2029, up from €66.8 billion (about $72.1 billion) in 2024—an increase of 150% over five years.
On the French side, the updated trajectory of the 2024–2030 Military Programming Law—France’s multi-year defense spending plan—projects €76.3 billion (about $82.4 billion) in 2030, or 2.5% of GDP. The Senate’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has proposed adding €14 billion (about $15.1 billion) to reach €83.9 billion (about $90.6 billion), a level it says is more compatible with a NATO commitment of 3.5% of GDP. Even under that more optimistic scenario, the gap with Berlin remains large.
For Mandon, timing matters as much as totals. “If Germany continues at this pace, in five years, the argument that we benefit from operational experience and a certain culture will no longer hold,” he said. He added: “For the Americans, the European reference is gradually becoming Germany.” Berlin plans to “spend three times more than France each year,” he said; “after five years, the differential will be striking.”
Nuclear deterrence remains France’s key structural advantage
In Mandon’s assessment, France still holds one major lever Germany does not: nuclear deterrence. “Nuclear deterrence is part of Europe’s defense equation,” he told senators.
He pointed to the significance of a speech delivered by France’s president at Île Longue, the base associated with France’s sea-based nuclear forces. “For the first time, he is calling on us to think together about our defense,” Mandon said.
But nuclear forces do not cover every conventional need, he argued, and he flagged what he sees as a coordination shortfall with allies. “When we draw up the military programming law or its update, we have very little dialogue with our allies. We need to communicate more,” he said, because “when the Germans plan to manufacture certain types of powerful missiles, that also concerns France.”
Germany’s new strategic review doesn’t mention France, Mandon says
The most worrying diplomatic signal Mandon raised may also be the quietest: Germany’s recently published strategic review “does not mention France a single time,” he told the Senate.
That silence, combined with Berlin’s ambition to have “the most powerful conventional army in Europe,” in the words of German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, points to a reshaping of European military leadership—one that Mandon suggested France’s current budget trajectory may struggle to contest.
