Reports Say U.S. Investors Are Eyeing a Nord Stream 2 Comeback, A Stunning Reversal on Russian Gas

Nord Stream 2, the Russian-built pipeline that became a political third rail after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, is suddenly back in the conversation, and the twist is hard to miss: reports in European media say Americans may be exploring ways to bring it back.

The pipeline was finished in 2021 but never entered service, and one of its two lines was later damaged in the 2022 sabotage that rocked the Baltic Sea energy network. Now, accounts of behind-the-scenes contacts in Switzerland are raising a volatile question for Europe and Washington alike: could U.S.-linked investors end up helping revive an asset the United States spent years trying to stop?

Swiss-based operator, off-the-books talks, and a familiar cast of characters

The discussions described in early March 2025 center on Nord Stream 2 AG, the pipeline’s operator, which is headquartered in Steinhausen in Switzerland’s Zug canton, an area known for hosting international companies and favorable corporate rules.

According to the reports, some of the outreach has happened outside official government channels, and Germany’s government is not described as a direct participant. That matters because Nord Stream 2 isn’t just another piece of infrastructure; it’s a strategic lever tied to Europe’s energy security and the West’s sanctions regime against Russia.

One name driving the controversy is Matthias Warnig, a longtime Nord Stream-linked executive widely described in European coverage as close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The reports say Warnig has sought to build a bridge to the current U.S. administration through private investors, an approach that, even if legal, is politically radioactive.

Another name that surfaced is Richard Grenell, a Trump ally who served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and later as acting director of national intelligence. Some accounts claim Grenell made unofficial visits connected to the company; Grenell has denied involvement. In European capitals, that kind of ambiguity is often read as a trial balloon, especially when the stakes are this high.

The basic commercial pitch, as described by some outlets: if American investors could position themselves to control or influence the “valve” on a major gas route into Germany, they could capture transit-style revenue and gain leverage over a critical supply line. Politically, it would amount to the U.S. gaining direct influence over a dependency Washington has condemned for years.

From sanctioning Nord Stream 2 to potentially managing it?

For most of the last decade, the U.S. position on Nord Stream 2 was blunt: don’t build it, don’t turn it on. Washington argued the pipeline would deepen Europe’s reliance on Russian gas and weaken Ukraine by routing energy around it.

President Donald Trump, in particular, hammered Germany publicly starting in 2018, accusing Berlin of effectively funding Moscow through energy purchases while relying on U.S. protection through NATO. (NATO is the U.S.-led defense alliance that includes most of Europe.)

That’s why any hint of U.S. involvement now, even indirectly through private capital, reads like a sharp pivot. As one former European diplomat quoted in the French article put it, moving from outright opposition to trying to “manage the flow” changes the argument from principle to control.

There’s also a hard legal reality: U.S. sanctions remain a lock on the asset. Any serious move, buying, operating, repairing, or restarting Nord Stream 2, would likely require U.S. licenses or exemptions. That turns any “private” initiative into a political decision, because the U.S. government still holds the keys.

And the U.S. isn’t a single actor. Congress, the White House, and business interests often pull in different directions. In 2021, Republican senators pushed measures that helped freeze the project. In 2025, press reports suggest more flexible signals may be emerging, but any shift will be interpreted as a message about Ukraine and the West’s posture toward Moscow.

A distressed-asset bet: Stephen Lynch and the postwar scenario

One figure repeatedly cited in the reporting is Stephen Lynch, an investment banker known for buying or structuring distressed assets, properties or projects that are effectively stuck because of politics, lawsuits, or financial collapse.

The bet is straightforward: if the war ends, if sanctions loosen, and if Europe’s energy politics shift, Nord Stream 2 could become monetizable again. For Germany’s energy-intensive industries, cheaper pipeline gas has long been a competitive advantage, one reason the project had supporters before the invasion of Ukraine upended the debate.

In Germany, another anxiety has also grown: dependence on liquefied natural gas (LNG), including U.S. LNG, which is shipped by tanker and can be more expensive and exposed to global price swings and port capacity constraints.

But the biggest obstacle isn’t financial engineering, it’s politics. Would Berlin actually choose to buy Russian gas again after Russia used energy as leverage and after Europe rallied behind Ukraine? Lynch reportedly sought a U.S. sanctions waiver in early 2024, but no approval has been publicly reported. Without that, the idea remains theoretical.

Even with a waiver, banks, insurers, and industrial partners would weigh reputational risk, sometimes a bigger deterrent than interest rates.

Sabotage damage, corrosion risk, and a Danish permit: the engineering isn’t simple

Restarting Nord Stream 2 isn’t just a matter of signing contracts. One of the two lines was damaged in the 2022 sabotage that ruptured parts of the Nord Stream system under the Baltic Sea, triggering investigations and years of speculation about responsibility.

Reports over the past few years have pointed to competing scenarios: costly repairs, or “mothballing” steps such as sealing ends and treating the interior to limit seawater corrosion. The key unknown is the pipeline’s condition after years in a harsh saltwater environment, something that can’t be settled without detailed inspection.

Offshore repair work is notoriously expensive because specialized vessels and custom components can run up costs quickly. As one offshore engineer quoted anonymously in the French article put it: on paper, it’s fixable; in the Baltic, every day a ship is on site costs a fortune.

Regulators have also moved in small but notable ways. Denmark’s Energy Agency granted Nord Stream 2 AG a permit in early 2025 for certain types of work. That doesn’t mean a restart is imminent, but it signals that at least some technical operations are possible under regulatory oversight.

The pipeline’s total price tag has been estimated at about $11 billion. A stranded asset of that size attracts dealmakers. But restarting it would require a full chain of approvals and capabilities: technical integrity, certification, insurance, sales contracts, and, above all, political acceptance.

Why Nord Stream 2 still splits Europe, and hits Ukraine hardest

Across Europe, Nord Stream 2 has become shorthand for what critics call a failed German bet on Russian energy. After the invasion of Ukraine, many European Union countries accelerated efforts to cut purchases of Russian fossil fuels, treating energy dependence as a national security vulnerability.

Nord Stream 2 is especially divisive because it bypasses transit countries, most importantly Ukraine. For Kyiv, gas that flows under the Baltic instead of across Ukrainian territory can mean less transit revenue and less strategic leverage over Moscow.

Inside Germany, the debate pits economic pressure against geopolitical reality. High energy costs squeeze heavy industry and manufacturing, but reopening the door to Russian gas could carry a steep political price at home and across Europe.

And if any negotiations are happening through quiet, unofficial channels, without clear coordination with European partners, the risk is reopening the same fractures that split the EU during the pipeline’s earlier battles. Nord Stream 2 was never just a pipeline. As long as the war, sanctions, and Europe’s security order revolve around Russia’s aggression, any step toward reviving it will be read as choosing sides.